Abstract. By generalizing Kreisel's proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem of Gödel I extract a general principle which can also be used for other purely model-theoretical proofs of that theorem.
and the final section 3 reformulates Kreisel's proof of the Second G.I.T. by using the Model Chain Lemma. For the sake of simplicity I will restrict myself to Peano Arithmetic PA, but the following results are generalizable to more general settings in a direct manner.
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Preliminaries
This section only reminds of some well-known facts.
L PA is the first-order language of arithmetic, possessing the non-logical constants 0, s (successor), +, ·, = and <, the logical operators ∧, ∨, →, ↔, ∀ and ∃, the variables v i (i ∈ N, where N is the set of all natural numbers) and the brackets (, ). For the sake of later convenience all these L PA -symbols should be appropriate finite sequences of length one; then the L PA -strings can be chosen as concatenations of finitely many L PA -symbols. Since I only deal with the language L PA here I usually suppress its mentioning. For any (L PA -) term t, t(t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ) is the result of substituting the term t i for all free occurrences of v i in t for all i < k. Similarly φ(t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ) is used for formulas φ. For every n ∈ N, n is s · · · s n times 0.
An (L PA -) theory is a set of (L PA -) sentences, an (L PA -) semi-theory is a set of (L PA -) formulas; and ⊢ Φ φ means that the formula φ is provable within the (semi-) theory Φ. ∆ PA 0 is the set of all formulas φ with ⊢ PA φ ↔ ψ for some formula ψ containing no or only bounded quantifier prefixes ∀(x < t) or ∃(x < t). Σ PA 1 exactly consists of those formulas φ with ⊢ PA φ↔∃xψ for some ∆ PA 0 -formula ψ. And ∆ PA 1 contains all Σ PA 1 -formulas φ with ¬φ ∈ Σ PA 1 , too. All these sets possess some nice and well-known closure properties: ] means that φ is always true in S when assigning s i ∈ |S| to v i for all i < k, and assigning arbitrary s ∈ |S| to all other variables occurring free in φ. N is the standard model of PA; hence |N| = N holds. For any theory Φ a structure M is a model of Φ iff M φ is true for all φ ∈ Φ.
The importance of Σ PA 1 -and ∆ PA 1 -formulas results from their 'nice behaviour' under embeddings of models of PA. An embedding E of a structure S into a structure T is a 1-1 function E: |S| → |T | such that, for all s, t ∈ |S|, 
Proof. The proof amounts to a straightforward formula induction over φ. 4 2 An important corollary of this lemma establishes the so-called Σ 1 -completeness of PA. I give a model-theoretical formulation because I will later need this one:
Proof. Using that M is a model of PA it is not difficult to show that
Thus the claim directly follows from lemma 1.1.
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Finally, an individual s ∈ |S| is defined by φ in S iff the (0-ary) function ∅ → s is defined by φ in S. Every formula φ defines at most one relation, function or individual in S; in this case φ M is the respective relation, function or individual. Furthermore a formula φ defines some k-ary relation in S iff φ contains exactly v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v k−1 free; whereas φ defines a k-ary function in S iff exactly v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v k occur free in φ and S ∀v 0 ∀v 1 · · · ∀v k−1 ∃ =1 v k φ holds; and φ defines some individual in M iff φ contains exactly v 0 free and S ∃ =1 v 0 φ holds. Some useful possibilities to get definable relations or functions from given ones should be mentioned. Piecewise PA-definition of functions is simple: If φ, ψ and χ are formulas then there is a formula {φ : χ/ψ} such that, if φ, ψ and χ define G, H:
, and
The next example concerns PA-substitution: For any for-
The following example is extremely important and provides some kind of PA-recursion: For any two formulas φ and ψ there is a formula rec{φ, ψ} such that rec{φ, ψ} defines in S a function F : |S| k+1 → |S| satisfying the two con-
Finally, PA-minimization should be mentioned: For any formula φ a formula µ{φ} exists such that µ{φ} ∈ Σ PA 1 follows from φ ∈ ∆ PA 1 , and µ{φ} defines in S the function F : holds.
The definability of relations, functions and individuals in structures is used to formalize a certain portion of logic within PA which is of crucial importance for the Second G.I.T. This very formalization I will call "representation in PA"; I explain it for a k-ary relation R ⊆ N k (functions and individuals have to be treated analogously): To represent R in PA it doesn't suffice to find a formula φ that defines R within the standard model N; moreover φ has to define in every model 1 -formulas fseq, len, 2, memb and app such that fseq represents in PA the 1-ary relation expressed by the phrase "n 0 is the code of a finite sequence" (i.e. there is an i ∈ N with n 0 = fs(i)), len the 1-ary function expressed by "n 1 is the length of the finite sequence with the code n 0 " (i.e. n 1 = Len(fs −1 (n 0 )), where Len(α) is the length of the finite sequence α), 2 the individual coding the empty sequence, memb the 2-ary function expressed by "n 2 is the n 0 th member of the finite sequence with code n 1 " and app the 2-ary function expressed by "n 2 is the code of the finite sequence which results from the finite sequence with code n 0 by appending n 1 as last element". 5 These formulas can be chosen such that, for any model M of PA and s, e ∈ |M|, s, e < M app M (s, e) holds if s ∈ fseq M . 6 Using these basic formulas all other interesting relations and functions for finite sequences can be defined by PA-substitution, piecewise PA-definition, PA-recursion and PA-minimization. Below formulas ⌢ and last are needed representing in PA the 1-ary function expressed by "n 1 is the code of the finite sequence resulting from concatenation of all finite sequences being members of the finite sequence with code n 0 " and the 1-ary function expressed by "n 1 is the 5 I use the following canonical notation to express the connection between a formula φ and the relation or function represented by φ: ni is always the (i + 1)th argument of the relation or function just considered, and, for a function F , the ni with the highest index is the value of F . 6 Here the notation for definable relations, functions and individuals introduced above is used: app M is the function defined by app in M; thus app M has two arguments and not three! 1 we get what we want.) Now it is not difficult to proceed: Fix suitable ∆ PA 1 -formulas form and sent to represent in PA the 1-ary relation expressed by "n 0 is the Gödel number of a formula" and the 1-ary relation expressed by "n 0 is the Gödel number of a sentence"; choose both formulas such that M form → fseq for every model M of PA holds. 7 The next step concerns formalization of theories and provability. Let M be a model of PA. A semi-theory formula with k parameters in M is a formula φ such that exactly v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v k occur free in φ and M φ → form holds. Similarly, φ is a theory formula with k parameters in M iff exactly v 0 , v 1 , . . ., v k occur free in φ and M φ → sent holds. If φ is a (semi-) theory formula with k parameters in every model M of PA then for every n 0 , n 1 , . . .
} is a (semi-) theory. A well-known result tells us that in this case there is a formula prov φ having the same free variables as φ and a formula con φ with the same free variables as φ except v 0 such that prov φ , ¬con φ ∈ Σ PA 1 follows from φ ∈ Σ PA 1 and, for every n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k−1 ∈ N, prov φ (v 0 , n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k−1 ) represents the 1-ary relation expressed by "n 0 is the Gödel number of a formula provable in Φ(n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k−1 )" and con φ (n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k−1 ) represents the 0-ary relation expressed by "Φ(n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k−1 ) is consistent in PA". There is an important connection between theories 'in the real world' and theory for-mulas: If Φ is a recursively enumerable (L PA -) theory (i.e. the class {gn(φ) | φ ∈ Φ} is recursively enumerable) then there is a Σ PA 1 -formula χ defining {gn(φ) | φ ∈ Φ} in N. Take the shortest such χ and set th Φ = def χ ∧ sent; then th Φ defines {gn(φ) | φ ∈ Φ} in N too, is a Σ PA 1 -formula and a theory formula without parameters for every model M of PA.
It is time to turn to the Model Chain Lemma.
The Arithmetized Completeness Theorem and the Model Chain Lemma
Now the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem can be stated: 
Proof. The proof amounts to a more or less straightforward formalization of a proof of the ordinary Completeness Theorem by reasoning inside M instead of "the real world": Starting with th Φ construct a suitable semi-theory formula henk Φ without parameters for every model of Φ such that henk Φ represents a Henkin semi-theory for Φ if M con th Φ holds. Then a formalization of the Lindenbaum completion leads to true Φ , and the remaining formulas result from formalizing the definition of the canonical term model of Φ within M. 8 2
The next proposition establishes an important connection between a model of PA and another model being strongly defined in it: 
i<m is a henk PA -leftmost path in M too. for all formula paths Γ and m ≤ Len(Γ).
To get a contradiction let us now assume that there is a sequence [M k ] k∈N of models of PA and an n * ∈ N such that (M1) and (M2) hold. First of all, (4) For all k, m ∈ N exactly one formula path Γ exists such that Len(Γ) = m and ♯Γ M k is a henk PA -leftmost formula path in M k .
To see that there is at most such a formula path take formula paths Γ, ∆ such that Len(Γ ( According to (4) we can set for every k ∈ N: Γ (k) = def the formula Γ path of length n * with ♯Γ M k is henk PA -leftmost path in M k .
For every k ∈ N we have:
[int PA i ] i<5 , true PA in M k by using the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem because M con th PA holds for every model M of PA by assumption. Now use the Diagonalization Lemma to find a sentence γ such that M k γ ↔ ¬true PA (γ) holds for every k ∈ N, and set n * = gn(γ).
Thus we have found a sequence [M k ] k∈N of models of PA and an n * ∈ N fulfilling both conditions of the Model Chain Lemma: (M1) directly follows from the definition of [M k ] k∈N , (M2) is clear by the choice of n * and by setting n k = def n * for all k ∈ N. But this is, according to this very Lemma, impossible.
